Dragon slaying with ambiguity: theory and experiments
Kelsey, D; Roux, S
Date: 1 March 2016
Journal
Journal of Public Economic Theory
Publisher
Wiley
Publisher DOI
Abstract
This paper studies the impact of ambiguity in the best shot and weakest link models
of public good provision. The models are Örst analysed theoretically. Then we conduct
experiments to study how ambiguity a§ects behaviour in these games. We test whether
subjectsí perception of ambiguity di§ers between a local opponent and a foreign ...
This paper studies the impact of ambiguity in the best shot and weakest link models
of public good provision. The models are Örst analysed theoretically. Then we conduct
experiments to study how ambiguity a§ects behaviour in these games. We test whether
subjectsí perception of ambiguity di§ers between a local opponent and a foreign one. We
Önd that an ambiguity safe strategy, is often chosen by subjects. This is compatible with
the hypothesis that ambiguity aversion ináuences behaviour in games. Subjects tend to
choose contributions above (resp. below) the Nash equilibrium in the Best Shot (resp.
Weakest Link) model.
Economics
Faculty of Environment, Science and Economy
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