dc.contributor.author | Kelsey, D | |
dc.contributor.author | Roux, S | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-02-01T10:15:17Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2016-03 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper studies the impact of ambiguity in the best shot and weakest link models
of public good provision. The models are Örst analysed theoretically. Then we conduct
experiments to study how ambiguity a§ects behaviour in these games. We test whether
subjectsí perception of ambiguity di§ers between a local opponent and a foreign one. We
Önd that an ambiguity safe strategy, is often chosen by subjects. This is compatible with
the hypothesis that ambiguity aversion ináuences behaviour in games. Subjects tend to
choose contributions above (resp. below) the Nash equilibrium in the Best Shot (resp.
Weakest Link) model. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Vol. 19, pp. 78–197 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/jpet.12185 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/25522 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Wiley | en_GB |
dc.rights.embargoreason | Publisher policy | en_GB |
dc.subject | Public goods | en_GB |
dc.subject | Ambiguity | en_GB |
dc.subject | Choquet expected utility | en_GB |
dc.subject | strategic complements | en_GB |
dc.subject | weakest link | en_GB |
dc.subject | best shot. | en_GB |
dc.title | Dragon slaying with ambiguity: theory and experiments | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.identifier.issn | 1097-3923 | |
dc.description | This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from the publisher via the DOI in this record. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | Journal of Public Economic Theory | en_GB |