Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorKelsey, D
dc.contributor.authorRoux, S
dc.date.accessioned2017-02-01T10:15:17Z
dc.date.issued2016-03
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the impact of ambiguity in the best shot and weakest link models of public good provision. The models are Örst analysed theoretically. Then we conduct experiments to study how ambiguity a§ects behaviour in these games. We test whether subjectsí perception of ambiguity di§ers between a local opponent and a foreign one. We Önd that an ambiguity safe strategy, is often chosen by subjects. This is compatible with the hypothesis that ambiguity aversion ináuences behaviour in games. Subjects tend to choose contributions above (resp. below) the Nash equilibrium in the Best Shot (resp. Weakest Link) model.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationVol. 19, pp. 78–197en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/jpet.12185
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/25522
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherWileyen_GB
dc.rights.embargoreasonPublisher policyen_GB
dc.subjectPublic goodsen_GB
dc.subjectAmbiguityen_GB
dc.subjectChoquet expected utilityen_GB
dc.subjectstrategic complementsen_GB
dc.subjectweakest linken_GB
dc.subjectbest shot.en_GB
dc.titleDragon slaying with ambiguity: theory and experimentsen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.identifier.issn1097-3923
dc.descriptionThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from the publisher via the DOI in this record.en_GB
dc.identifier.journalJournal of Public Economic Theoryen_GB


Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record