Patent breadth in an international setting
Bond, E; Zissimos, BC
Date: 27 February 2017
Journal
Economic Inquiry
Publisher
Wiley for Western Economic Association International
Publisher DOI
Abstract
This paper examines the Nash equilibria of a game where two national
governments set patent breadth, which determines how di§erent an imitating
Örmís product must be in order to avoid infringing on an innovatorís patent. The
e§ect of broadening patent breadth is to increase the incentive to invest in R&D,
which is the same e§ect ...
This paper examines the Nash equilibria of a game where two national
governments set patent breadth, which determines how di§erent an imitating
Örmís product must be in order to avoid infringing on an innovatorís patent. The
e§ect of broadening patent breadth is to increase the incentive to invest in R&D,
which is the same e§ect as increasing patent length. However, unlike the e§ect
on static e¢ ciency of increasing patent length, our results show that the e§ect of
broadening patent breadth on static e¢ ciency is non-monotonic. As a result, under
our North-South model where only the North can innovate, harmonization of patent
breadth lowers world welfare. In our North-North model, where innovation can occur
anywhere, we show that harmonization towards narrower patent breadth may raise
world welfare.
Economics
Faculty of Environment, Science and Economy
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