dc.contributor.author | Bond, E | |
dc.contributor.author | Zissimos, BC | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-02-01T16:12:37Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017-02-27 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper examines the Nash equilibria of a game where two national
governments set patent breadth, which determines how di§erent an imitating
Örmís product must be in order to avoid infringing on an innovatorís patent. The
e§ect of broadening patent breadth is to increase the incentive to invest in R&D,
which is the same e§ect as increasing patent length. However, unlike the e§ect
on static e¢ ciency of increasing patent length, our results show that the e§ect of
broadening patent breadth on static e¢ ciency is non-monotonic. As a result, under
our North-South model where only the North can innovate, harmonization of patent
breadth lowers world welfare. In our North-North model, where innovation can occur
anywhere, we show that harmonization towards narrower patent breadth may raise
world welfare. | en_GB |
dc.description.sponsorship | Center for the Americas at Vanderbilt University | |
dc.identifier.citation | Published online 27 February 2017 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/ecin.12440 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/25533 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Wiley for Western Economic Association International | en_GB |
dc.rights.embargoreason | Publisher policy | en_GB |
dc.subject | Coordination | en_GB |
dc.subject | innovation | en_GB |
dc.subject | patent breadth | en_GB |
dc.subject | patent race | en_GB |
dc.subject | R&D | en_GB |
dc.title | Patent breadth in an international setting | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.identifier.issn | 0095-2583 | |
dc.description | This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Wiley via the DOI in this record. | |
dc.identifier.journal | Economic Inquiry | en_GB |