When Costly Voting is Beneficial
Chakravarty, S; Kaplan, TR; Myles, G
Date: 20 September 2018
Journal
Journal of Public Economics
Publisher
Elsevier
Publisher DOI
Abstract
We present a costly voting model in which each voter has a private valuation for their
preferred outcome of a vote. When there is a zero cost to voting, all voters vote and hence all
values are counted equally regardless of how high they may be. By having a cost to voting, only
those with high enough values would choose to incur ...
We present a costly voting model in which each voter has a private valuation for their
preferred outcome of a vote. When there is a zero cost to voting, all voters vote and hence all
values are counted equally regardless of how high they may be. By having a cost to voting, only
those with high enough values would choose to incur this cost. We show that, by adding this
cost, welfare may be enhanced even when the cost of voting is wasteful. Such an e§ect occurs
when there is both a large enough density of voters with low values and the expected value of
voters is high enough.
Economics
Faculty of Environment, Science and Economy
Item views 0
Full item downloads 0