dc.contributor.author | Chakravarty, S | |
dc.contributor.author | Kaplan, TR | |
dc.contributor.author | Myles, G | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-08-28T09:26:32Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018-09-20 | |
dc.description.abstract | We present a costly voting model in which each voter has a private valuation for their
preferred outcome of a vote. When there is a zero cost to voting, all voters vote and hence all
values are counted equally regardless of how high they may be. By having a cost to voting, only
those with high enough values would choose to incur this cost. We show that, by adding this
cost, welfare may be enhanced even when the cost of voting is wasteful. Such an e§ect occurs
when there is both a large enough density of voters with low values and the expected value of
voters is high enough. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Vol. 167, pp. 33-42. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.08.013 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/33821 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_GB |
dc.rights.embargoreason | Under embargo until 20 September 2020 in compliance with publisher policy. | en_GB |
dc.rights | © 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | |
dc.subject | costly voting | en_GB |
dc.subject | externalities | en_GB |
dc.title | When Costly Voting is Beneficial | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.identifier.issn | 0047-2727 | |
dc.description | This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Elsevier via the DOI in this record. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | Journal of Public Economics | en_GB |