Pareto-improving indirect tax coordination and tax diversity
Kotsogiannis, C; Lopez-Garcia, Miguel-Angel
Date: 12 December 2019
Journal
Oxford Economic Papers
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Publisher DOI
Abstract
Coordination in tax matters, in the EU and elsewhere, has been largely driven by the movement of taxes towards some common level and, therefore, towards tax uniformity. Making use of a perfectly competitive general equilibrium framework of international trade in which governments provide global public goods, it is shown that, starting ...
Coordination in tax matters, in the EU and elsewhere, has been largely driven by the movement of taxes towards some common level and, therefore, towards tax uniformity. Making use of a perfectly competitive general equilibrium framework of international trade in which governments provide global public goods, it is shown that, starting from a Nash equilibrium, there exist strict Pareto-improving multilateral tax reforms that are consistent with tax diversity.
Economics
Faculty of Environment, Science and Economy
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