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dc.contributor.authorKotsogiannis, C
dc.contributor.authorLopez-Garcia, Miguel-Angel
dc.date.accessioned2019-10-11T10:07:23Z
dc.date.issued2019-12-12
dc.description.abstractCoordination in tax matters, in the EU and elsewhere, has been largely driven by the movement of taxes towards some common level and, therefore, towards tax uniformity. Making use of a perfectly competitive general equilibrium framework of international trade in which governments provide global public goods, it is shown that, starting from a Nash equilibrium, there exist strict Pareto-improving multilateral tax reforms that are consistent with tax diversity.en_GB
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomic and Social Research Council (ESRC)en_GB
dc.identifier.citationPublished online 12 December 2019.en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/oep/gpz073
dc.identifier.grantnumberES/S00713X/1en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/39165
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen_GB
dc.rights.embargoreasonUnder embargo until 12 December 2021 in compliance with publisher policy.en_GB
dc.rights© Oxford University Press 2019. All rights reserved.
dc.subjectIndirect tax coordinationen_GB
dc.subjecttax diversityen_GB
dc.subjectreform of commodity taxesen_GB
dc.subjectglobal public goodsen_GB
dc.titlePareto-improving indirect tax coordination and tax diversityen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2019-10-11T10:07:23Z
dc.identifier.issn0030-7653
dc.descriptionThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Oxford University Press via the DOI in this record.en_GB
dc.identifier.journalOxford Economic Papersen_GB
dc.rights.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserveden_GB
dcterms.dateAccepted2019-09-30
exeter.funder::Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)en_GB
rioxxterms.versionAMen_GB
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2019-09-30
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_GB
refterms.dateFCD2019-10-11T09:54:54Z
refterms.versionFCDAM
refterms.panelCen_GB


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