Vote or shout
Kaplan, Todd R.
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Walter de Gruyter
We examine an environment with n voters each with a private value over two alternatives. We compare the social surplus of two mechanisms for deciding: majority voting and shouting, that is, the voter who shouts the loudest (sends the costliest wasteful signal) chooses the outcome. We find that it is optimal to use voting in the case where n is large and value for each particular alternative of the voters is bounded. In For other cases, the superior mechanism is depends upon the order statistics of the distribution of values.
Draft version dated April 2010 issued as discussion paper by University of Exeter Business School, Final version published by Walter de Gruyter; available online at http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte
Vol. 10, Issue 1
1473 – 3307