Vote or shout
Chakravarty, Surajeet; Kaplan, Todd R.
Date: 1 September 2010
Journal
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Publisher
Walter de Gruyter
Publisher DOI
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Abstract
We examine an environment with n voters each with a private value over two alternatives. We compare the social surplus of two mechanisms for deciding: majority voting and shouting, that is, the voter who shouts the loudest (sends the costliest wasteful signal) chooses the outcome. We find that it is optimal to use voting in the case ...
We examine an environment with n voters each with a private value over two alternatives. We compare the social surplus of two mechanisms for deciding: majority voting and shouting, that is, the voter who shouts the loudest (sends the costliest wasteful signal) chooses the outcome. We find that it is optimal to use voting in the case where n is large and value for each particular alternative of the voters is bounded. In For other cases, the superior mechanism is depends upon the order statistics of the distribution of values.
Economics
Faculty of Environment, Science and Economy
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