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Vote or shout

dc.contributor.authorChakravarty, Surajeeten_GB
dc.contributor.authorKaplan, Todd R.en_GB
dc.date.accessioned2013-01-31T14:33:44Zen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-19T15:49:05Z
dc.date.issued2010-09en_GB
dc.description.abstractWe examine an environment with n voters each with a private value over two alternatives. We compare the social surplus of two mechanisms for deciding: majority voting and shouting, that is, the voter who shouts the loudest (sends the costliest wasteful signal) chooses the outcome. We find that it is optimal to use voting in the case where n is large and value for each particular alternative of the voters is bounded. In For other cases, the superior mechanism is depends upon the order statistics of the distribution of values.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationVol. 10, Issue 1en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.2202/1935-1704.1682en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10036/4245en_GB
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherWalter de Gruyteren_GB
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomics Department Discussion Papers Series 10/06en_GB
dc.relation.urlhttp://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/economics/papers/en_GB
dc.relation.urlhttp://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejteen_GB
dc.subjectvotingen_GB
dc.subjectlobbyingen_GB
dc.subjectorder statisticsen_GB
dc.titleVote or shouten_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2013-01-31T14:33:44Zen_GB
dc.date.available2013-03-19T15:49:05Z
dc.identifier.issn1935-1704en_GB
dc.identifier.issn1473-3307en_GB
exeter.article-number42en_GB
dc.descriptionDraft version dated April 2010 issued as discussion paper by University of Exeter Business School, Final version published by Walter de Gruyter; available online at http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejteen_GB
dc.identifier.journalThe B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economicsen_GB


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